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I. INTRODUCTION
This article focuses on the interpretations of and changes relating to oil,
gas, and mineral law in Texas from November 1, 2014, through October
31, 2015. The cases examined include decisions of state and federal courts
in the State of Texas and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.1
* Attorney at Law, Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas (www.bf-law.com).
1. This article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas, and mineral law decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states are
not included. Page limitations of this publication required the omission of some cases of
interest. The facts in the cases are sometimes simplified to focus on the legal principles.
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II. TITLE AND CONVEYANCING ISSUES2
A. COSGROVE V. CADE
Cosgrove v. Cade held that under the common law and under the re-
cording statute a plain omission in an unambiguous deed charges the par-
ties with irrebuttable notice of the deed’s contents when the deed is
executed, and the discovery rule does not toll the statute of limitations.3
In October 2006, Michael and Billie Cade (Grantors) sold two acres of
land to Barbara Cosgrove (Grantee). The real estate contract reserved all
of the mineral rights; however, the deed conveyed the land in fee simple.
There was also a closing document entitled “Acceptance of Title and
Closing Agreements” that required both parties to “fully cooperate, ad-
just, and correct any errors or omissions and to execute any and all docu-
ments needed or necessary to comply with all provisions of the above
mentioned real estate contract.”4 In December 2010, the Grantors be-
came aware of the issue with their reservation and promptly filed suit for
a declaratory judgment to reform the deed, for breach of contract under
the Acceptance of Title and Closing Agreements document, and for vari-
ous torts. Grantors’ claims were subject to either a two or four-year stat-
ute of limitations.5
The first issue before the Texas Supreme Court was whether the discov-
ery rule tolls the statute of limitations when there is “a mistaken-but-
unmistakable omission in an unambiguous warranty deed.”6 The discov-
ery rule “defers accrual of a claim until the injured party learned of, or in
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of, the wrongful
act causing the injury.”7 “A plainly evident omission on an unambiguous
deed’s face is not a type of injury for which the discovery rule is availa-
ble.”8 “There is generally a rebuttable presumption that a grantor has
2. Other cases dealing with title and conveyancing issues include the following:
Lykken v. Kindsvater, No. 02-13-00214-CV, 2014 WL 5771832 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Nov. 6, 2014, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (outstanding oil and gas leases as breach of
covenant of seizen); Griswold v. EOG Res., Inc., 459 S.W.3d 713 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2015, no pet.) (deed exception); Cole v. McWillie, 464 S.W.3d 896 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2015, pet. denied) (deed executed by attorney-in-fact); Medina Interests, Ltd. v. Trial, 469
S.W.3d 619 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. denied) (fixed or floating royalty); Leal v.
Cuanto Antes Mejor LLC, No. 04-14-00694-CV, 2015 WL 3999034 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (fixed or floating royalty); Saenz v. Thorp Petroleum
Corp., No. 04-14-00527-CV, 2015 WL 4273270 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. denied)
(partition agreement); Orca Assets, G.P., L.L.C. v. Dorfman, 470 S.W.3d 153 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2015, pet. denied) (bona fide purchaser); Fort Apache Energy, Inc. v. Hous.
Energy, L.P., No. 09-14-00007-CV, 2015 WL 5042133 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 27,
2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (proportionate reduction of overriding royalty); Red Boot Prod.
Co. v. Samson Expl., LLC, No. 09-14-00191-CV, 2015 WL 5730789 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
Oct. 1, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (conveyance to centerline of canal); Hosek v. Scott, No.
04-14-00655-CV, 2015 WL 6163385 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 21, 2015, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (partition agreement).
3. Cosgrove v. Cade, 468 S.W.3d 32, 34–35 (Tex. 2015).
4. Id. at 35.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 34, 36.
7. Id. at 36 (citing Sullivan v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39, 45 (Tex. 1971)).
8. Id.
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immediate knowledge of defects in a deed that result from mutual mis-
take.”9 “Once the presumption is rebutted, the reformation claim does
not accrue until the grantor actually knew, or in the exercise of reasona-
ble diligence should have known of the mistake.”10 However, “[p]arties
are charged as a matter of law with knowledge of an unambiguous deed’s
material omissions from the date of its execution, and the statute of limi-
tations runs from that date.”11 The Grantors were charged with knowl-
edge that their deed did not include a mineral reservation from the date
of execution in October 2006. Thus, the applicable statute of limitations
for their claims had already run in December 2010.12
The second issue in the case was whether Property Code § 13.002 (re-
cording statute)—“[a]n instrument that is properly recorded in the
proper country is . . . notice to all persons of the existence of the instru-
ment”—also provides all persons, including the grantor, with notice of
the deed’s contents.13 The supreme court previously held that knowledge
imputed as constructive notice under the statute applied to grantees, and
therefore, the discovery rule was unavailable to grantees to toll the stat-
ute as to obvious omissions in unambiguous deeds.14 In this case, the su-
preme court extended the holding to include grantors.15
The supreme court then addressed the Grantors’ breach of contract
claim.16 Grantors contended that limitations on this claim did not begin
to run until Grantee refused to correct the deed.17 The supreme court did
not rely upon the merger doctrine.18 Instead, the supreme court reasoned
that the documents were part of a single transaction, the issue was obvi-
ous when the deed was executed, and the four-year statute for breach of
contract ran from the same date.19
The significance of this case is the holding that a plain omission in an
unambiguous deed charges the parties with irrebuttable notice of the
deed’s contents and the discovery rule does not apply to toll the statute of
limitations for reformation.20 The holding is limited to omissions from
unambiguous deeds.21 The clock will run on what the deed says, but per-
haps not as to what it means.
9. Id. (citing Sullivan, 471 S.W.2d at 45).
10. Id. at 36–37 (citing Sullivan, 471 S.W.2d at 45).
11. Id. at 37 (citing McClung v. Lawrence, 430 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Tex. 1968)).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 34 (quoting TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.002 (West 2014)) (alteration in
original).
14. Id. at 38–39.
15. Id. at 38.
16. Id. at 39–40.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 40.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 34.
21. See id. at 37.
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III. LEASE AND LEASING ISSUES22
A. ENDEAVOR ENERGY RESOURCES, L.P. V.
DISCOVERY OPERATING, INC.
Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P. v. Discovery Operating, Inc. held that
a lease terminated as to all acreage not included in a proration unit plat
filed with the Texas Railroad Commission (TRC).23 Endeavor et al.,
(Base Lessee) leased approximately 960 acres in an area subject to Spe-
cial Field Rules issued by the TRC for the Spraberry (Trend Area) Field.
The Special Field Rules provided for proration units of 80 acres or op-
tional 160 acres. Base Lessee drilled and completed enough wells to in-
clude all of the leased acreage in a proration unit. Two quarter sections,
however, were not included in any proration unit. Discovery et al., (Top
Lessee) leased the two quarter sections not included in a proration unit.24
The Base Leases had already terminated at the end of the continuous
development period, but the termination clauses included a limitation:
[T]his lease shall automatically terminate as to all lands and depths
covered herein, save and except those lands and depths located
within a government proration unit assigned to a well producing oil
. . . and . . . with each such governmental proration unit to contain
the number of acres required to comply with the applicable rules . . .
of the [TRC] for obtaining the maximum producing allowable for the
particular well.25
22. Other notable cases dealing with lease and leasing issues include the following:
Comm’r of Gen. Land Office v. SandRidge Energy, Inc., 454 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2014, pet. filed) (royalty on CO2); Trinity Materials, Inc. v. Sansom, No. 03-11-00483-
CV, 2014 WL 7464023 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 31, 2014, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (breach of
sand and gravel mining lease); Petrohawk Properties, L.P. v. Jones, 455 S.W.3d 753 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. dism’d) (failure to pay bonus); Albert v. Dunlap Expl., Inc.,
457 S.W.3d 554 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, pet. denied) (ratification of pooling modifying
Pugh clause); BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Laddex, Ltd., 458 S.W.3d 683 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2015, pet. filed) (production in paying quantities over a “reasonable” period of time); BP
Am. Prod. Co. v. Red Deer Res., LLC, 466 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2015, pet.
filed) (production in paying quantities and shut-in royalties); Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C. v.
Hyder, 483 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. 2015) (post-production cost burden on overriding royalty);
Clayton Williams Energy, Inc. v. BMT O & G TX, L.P., 473 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2015, pet. filed) (breach of lease’s assignment and operations clause); ROCA Res. Co.
v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., No. 4:14-CV-085-DAE, 2015 WL 4479118 (W.D. Tex. July 22,
2015) (ORRI assignment and duty to develop); Orca Assets, G.P., L.L.C. v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A., No. 05-13-01700-CV, 2015 WL 4736786 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 11,
2015, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (double leasing and disclaimer of warranty); Samson Expl.,
LLC v. T.S. Reed Properties, Inc., No. 09-13-00366-CV, 2015 WL 6295726 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont Oct. 22, 2015, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (amendment of pooled unit); Titan
Operating, LLC v. Marsden, No. 02-14-00303-CV, 2015 WL 5727573 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Aug. 27, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (nuisance claims by lessor against lessee and
quasi-estoppel); XOG Operating, LLC v. Chesapeake Expl. Ltd. P’ship, No. 07-13-00439-
CV, 2015 WL 5244718 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 2, 2015, pet. filed) (retained acreage
clause).
23. Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Discovery Operating, Inc., 448 S.W.3d 169, 178
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2014, pet. filed).
24. Id. at 171–74.
25. Id. at 172.
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Rule 3 of the Special Field Rules required operators to file certified plats
with the TRC that show “all of those things pertinent to the determina-
tion of the acreage credit claimed for each well.”26 The TRC would not
act on Base Lessee’s request to expand its proration units to include the
two missing quarter sections because of the pending title litigation be-
tween Base Lessee and Top Lessee.27
The single issue in the case was the interpretation and construction of
the automatic termination clause in the Base Leases.28 The parties and
the Eastland Court of Appeals agreed that the Base Leases were unam-
biguous.29 Top Lessee asserted that the Base Leases “automatically ter-
minated as to the lands in the disputed quarter sections because, on the
date that the continuous development period ended, the lands in the dis-
puted quarter sections were not located in a governmental proration unit
assigned by [Base Lessee] to a well.”30 Because the Special Field Rules
allow “a proration unit to contain 160 acres to obtain the maximum pro-
ducing allowable in a well in the Spraberry (Trend Area) Field,” Base
Lessee asserted that “each of its producing wells held 160 acres under
lease.”31 Base Lessee reasoned that the last “clause automatically estab-
lishe[d] the size of the proration units to be 160 acres” and that interpret-
ing the automatic termination provision to require it to assign acreage in
a certified proration plat ignored and would render meaningless the last
clause. Therefore, Base Lessee “was not required to file a proration plat
or to take any other action to maintain its leased acreage.”32
Considering the provision in its entirety, the court of appeals ruled that
the parties intended in the last clause to define the amount of acres that
Base Lessee “was to include in the governmental proration units that it
assigned in its certified proration plats filed with the [TRC].”33 Conclud-
ing that the last clause did not relieve Endeavor of its obligation “to as-
sign acreage to a well in a certified proration plat to maintain the acreage
under lease,” the court of appeals noted:
[I]t is not the failure to designate the larger proration unit that auto-
matically terminates the lease as to the disputed quarter sections; the
automatic termination is the result of the lease terms. The failure to
designate the additional acreage merely quantifies the amount of
acreage as to which the lease provides for automatic termination.34
The significance of the case is the literal reading of the lease and the
holding that the failure to include acreage in the plat filed with the TRC
was a failure to assign acreage to a proration unit, resulting in lease termi-
26. Id. at 177 (quoting Rule 3 of the Spraberry (Trend Area) Field Rules).
27. Id. at 174.
28. Id. at 175.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 177.
33. Id. at 177–78.
34. Id. at 178.
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nation as to all acreage not included in a proration unit.35
B. KCM FINANCIAL LLC V. BRADSHAW
KCM Financial LLC v. Bradshaw examines the nature of the duty
owed by the executive and the executive’s lessee to the non-executive in
an oil and gas leasing transaction.36 Two deeds executed in 1960 reserved
a non-participating royalty interest. The deeds reserved “an undivided
one-half of any future royalty,” but not less than a one-sixteenth (1/16)
share of gross production.37 The parties to the litigation aligned as succes-
sors to the Executive, Non-Executive, Lessee, and Executive’s Assignees.
The Executive leased for a one-eighth (1/8) royalty and a bonus of more
than $13 million, and the Executive conveyed part of the Executive’s roy-
alty interest to the Executive’s Assignees.38 The Non-Executive con-
tended that the terms of the leasing transaction were for a sub-market (1/
8 rather than 1/4) royalty rate (shared by the Executive and the Non-
Executive), an above-market bonus (payable only to the Executive), that
the Lessee acted in concert with the Executive, and that a constructive
trust should be imposed on the royalty payments payable to the Execu-
tive’s Assignees. The Executive and the other defendants won on sum-
mary judgment in the trial court.39 The core issue on appeal was the
nature of the duty owed by an executive to the non-executive.40
The Texas Supreme Court reviewed all of its prior holdings, which re-
ferred to the duty as one of “utmost fair dealing,” “confidential relation-
ship,” “utmost good faith,” or “a fiduciary relationship,” and which
occasionally held that “the executive’s duty is to ‘acquire for the non-
executive every benefit that he exacts for himself.’”41 The supreme court
concluded:
If the semantics surrounding the nature of this duty have shifted sub-
tly over the years, this much is clear: An executive owes a non-execu-
tive a duty that prohibits self-dealing but does not require the
executive to subjugate its interests to those of the non-executive.
Thus, in ascertaining whether the executive breached its duty to the
non-executive, the controlling inquiry is whether the executive en-
gaged in acts of self-dealing that unfairly diminished the value of the
non-executive interest. Although the contours of the duty remain
somewhat indistinct, these tenets guide our analysis of the claims
before us.42
35. Id. at 178–79.
36. KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 74 (Tex. 2015).
37. Id. at 75.
38. Id. at 76–78.
39. Id. at 74.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 80–81 (quoting Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd., 352 S.W.3d 479, 490 (Tex.
2011)).
42. Id. at 82.
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The supreme court recognized that “[a]s articulated, the executive’s duty
is deceptively simple in its explication, but not necessarily straightforward
in its application.”43
This is because “obtaining the same royalty” is not necessarily
equivalent to obtaining “the same benefit.”44 This case is focused on the
interplay between royalty and bonus, but the interests and benefits of the
executive and the non-executive can also diverge on other issues, such as
surface damages, water rights, well locations, easements, drilling commit-
ments, development of other tracts, and timing of development, etc. Ob-
viously, the executive will almost never acquire every benefit he acquires
for himself for the non-executive.45 For example, a non-participating roy-
alty owner does not share in bonus or delay rentals.46 “This situation thus
presents a conundrum that requires balancing the bundle of rights that
comprise a mineral estate.”47
The supreme court then examined the facts of the case and concluded
that on the record there was some evidence precluding summary judg-
ment on whether the Executive breached the Executive’s duty to the
Non-Executive.48 “Although in many cases this will be a fact question, we
do not foreclose the possibility that breach of duty may be determined as
a matter of law, depending on the evidence in a particular case.”49 Never-
theless, it is clear that a breach will generally be a fact question, yet the
supreme court does not expressly explain how the issue is to be submit-
ted. The opinion does say that “the subject transaction must be viewed as
a whole in determining whether the terms of a mineral lease, including
the negotiated royalty, reflect the executive’s utmost good faith and fair
dealing vis-a`-vis the non-executive.”50
Our decision today reaffirms a principle that has existed in our juris-
prudence for eighty years: An executive owes a duty of utmost good
faith and fair dealing to a non-executive and is prohibited from en-
gaging in self-dealing in connection with the formation of a mineral-
lease agreement. However, the failure to obtain a market-rate roy-
alty does not, in and of itself, constitute a breach of that duty.51
The supreme court then considered whether any of the derivative
claims against the Lessee could be sustained. Regardless of whether the
jury ultimately determines the Executive breached the Executive’s duty
to the Non-Executive, there was, as a matter of law, no evidence that
Lessee breached any duty owed to the Non-Executive.52 Regardless of
the Lessee’s knowledge of the existence of the non-participating royalty





48. Id. at 84.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 89.
52. Id. at 85.
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interest and regardless of the Lessee’s knowledge of the tension between
the Executive and the Non-Executive, “the uncontroverted evidence re-
flects that [Lessee] merely secured a mineral-lease agreement on mutu-
ally acceptable terms.”53
The Texas Oil & Gas Association argues in an amicus brief that a
lessee should not be tasked—directly or derivatively—with policing
the executive’s duty to non-executive interest holders. Nor should a
lessee be expected to give weight to a non-participating royalty inter-
est holder’s economic interests; as we have held, that is the execu-
tive’s responsibility. We agree with the Association that “in
negotiating with the executive, a lessee should not fear liability for
doing nothing more than getting a good deal closed.”54
If there is no existing fiduciary or confidential relationship between the
lessee and the non-executive, and if the lessor and lessee are unaffiliated
parties except as adverse parties in an arm’s-length leasing transaction,
after this decision, it is very unlikely that the lessee will be subjected to
some derivative liability or duty to the non-executive.55
The supreme court also rejected the constructive trust claim against the
royalty owned by the Executive’s Assignees, because the interest trans-
ferred to them was out of the one-half (1/2) interest owned by the Execu-
tive, which was not owned by the Non-Executive.56
The significance of the case is the effort to clarify the nature of the
duty: In the leasing transaction, it is not a traditional fiduciary duty; it is a
duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing. Breach of the duty will gener-
ally be a fact question, and the pivotal issue will usually be whether the
executive obtained some benefit for himself, but not for the non-execu-
tive, through some “legal contrivance” that unfairly diminishes the value
of the non-executive interest. The lessee generally has no duty to protect
the non-executive in the leasing transaction and need not fear liability for
doing nothing more than getting a good deal closed.
C. AYCOCK V. VANTAGE FORT WORTH ENERGY, LLC
Aycock v. Vantage Fort Worth Energy, LLC held that a recovery by
unleased cotenants for payment of bonus after ratification of the lease
must come from the lessor, not the lessee.57 Vantage leased some of the
cotenants in a 1,409-acre tract and paid its lessors $750 per net mineral
acre for their undivided 526-acre interest. Vantage never drilled and the
lease expired. The unleased cotenants claimed that they had ratified the
lease and sued Vantage for their share of the bonus.58
53. Id. at 85–86.
54. Id. at 86.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 88.
57. Aycock v. Vantage Fort Worth Energy, LLC, No. 11-13-00338-CV, 2015 WL
1322003, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 20, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
58. Id. at *1.
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The Eastland Court of Appeals introduced its analysis with the follow-
ing principle:
Owners of undivided mineral interests are tenants in common. A co-
tenant may lease its undivided interest without joinder of another
cotenant. The lease does not bind a nonconsenting cotenant. The les-
sor cotenant, however, must account to its nonconsenting cotenant
for any minerals produced where the lessor cotenant has leased both
its and the nonconsenting cotenant’s interest or has received produc-
tion payments on the nonconsenting cotenant’s interest.59
The unpaid cotenants argued that Vantage leased the entire 1,409 acres
and that they ratified the lease by a subsequent letter to Vantage.60 Van-
tage claimed that the proportionate reduction clause in the lease, along
with other documents, shows that Vantage only intended to lease the 526-
acre undivided interest.61 The court of appeals noted that “[a] propor-
tionate reduction clause acts to protect the lessee from paying the lessor
more than the lessor is due, but it does not act to reduce what the lessor
conveys to the lessee.”62
The court of appeals, however, assumed, without deciding, that Van-
tage leased the entire interest and that the unleased cotenants ratified the
lease.63 Vantage was “not the lessor cotenant and received no money ac-
cruing under the lease. Therefore, the unpaid mineral cotenants cannot
recover bonus money from Vantage.”64 The court of appeals concluded
that Vantage established that the unpaid cotenants could “only recover
[from] bonus money paid to” the lessors, if any, for the unleased coten-
ants’ interest.65 The unleased cotenants also could not recover against
Vantage on an unjust enrichment claim, because Vantage did not profit at
their expense.66
The significance of the case is the holding that a recovery by unleased
cotenants for payment of bonus after ratification of the lease must come
from the lessor, not the lessee.67
IV. INDUSTRY CONTRACTS68
A. IN RE DEEPWATER HORIZON
In re Deepwater Horizon held that an operator was not an additional
insured entitled to coverage for damages from subsurface pollution under
59. Id. (internal citations omitted).
60. Id. at *2.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing McMahon v. Christmann, 303 S.W.2d 341, 346 (Tex. 1957)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at *3 (internal citations omitted).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id. at *1–2.
68. Other cases dealing with industry contracts include the following: Cresson SWD
Servs., L.P. v. Basic Energy Servs., L.P., No. 02-13-00141-CV, 2014 WL 6686501 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Nov. 26, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (failure to complete reworking
of saltwater well); Gray v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., No. SA-14-CA-1020, 2015 WL
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the drilling contractor’s insurance policies because the drilling contract
limited the drilling contractor’s obligation to insure.69 “This is an insur-
ance-coverage dispute arising from the April 2010 explosion and sinking
of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig.”70 Various Transocean entities
(Transocean) owned the Deepwater Horizon, and operated in the Gulf of
Mexico pursuant to a drilling contract (Drilling Contract) with the BP
entities (BP) as the Operator. The rig exploded causing 11 deaths, numer-
ous injuries, and multiple claims for environmental and economic dam-
ages. In the Drilling Contract, Transocean agreed “to indemnify BP for
above-surface pollution regardless of fault, and BP agreed to indemnify
Transocean for all pollution risk Transocean did not assume, i.e., subsur-
face pollution.”71 “[T]he Drilling Contract further required Transocean to
carry multiple types of insurance at its own expense” and to name BP as
an additional insured.72 Transocean and BP sought coverage under Trans-
ocean’s primary and excess insurance policies.73 After BP made its de-
mand for coverage, Transocean aligned with the insurers and sought a
declaration that BP was not entitled to additional-insured coverage be-
cause the Drilling Contract limited the additional-insured obligation to
“liabilities assumed by [Transocean] under the terms of [the Drilling]
Contract,”74 and the only liabilities assumed by Transocean were for
above-surface pollution. The issues were: “(1) whether the language in
the insurance policies refers to, and thus incorporates, coverage limita-
tions in the Drilling Contract from which BP’s additional-insured status
derives; [and] (2) whether the Drilling Contract actually imposes any lim-
itation on the extent of additional-insured coverage under the primary-
339744 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2015) (breach of surface use agreement by use of off-site water);
Sanders Oil & Gas GP, LLC v. Ridgeway Elec., No. 08-13-00299-CV, 2015 WL 590874
(Tex. App.—El Paso Feb. 11, 2015, no pet.) (mechanic’s and materialman’s lien); Kilgore
Expl., Inc. v. Apache Corp., No. 01-13-00347-CV, 2015 WL 505275 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Feb. 5, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (payment of expenses in excess of AFE);
ConocoPhillips Co. v. Noble Energy, Inc., 462 S.W.3d 255 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2015, pet. filed) (executory contracts in bankruptcy); Prime Nat. Res., Inc. v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, No. 01-11-00995-CV, 2015 WL 1457534 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 26, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (well insurance); Kachina Pipeline
Co., Inc. v. Lillis, 471 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2015) (gas gathering agreement); Anderson Energy
Corp. v. Dominion Okla. Tex. Expl. & Prod., Inc., 469 S.W.3d 280 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2015, no pet.) (meaning of Contract Area under JOA); Dernick Res., Inc. v.
Wilstein, 471 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. filed) (duties of joint
venturers); BP Oil Pipeline Co. v. Plains Pipeline, L.P., 472 S.W.3d 296 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. filed) (PSA indemnity); Wolf Hollow I, L.P. v. El Paso
Mktg., L.P., 472 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (quality
provision in gas contract); Conglomerate Gas II, L.P. v. Gibb, No. 02-14-00119-CV, 2015
WL 6081919 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 15, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (assignment of
back-in); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Petroplex Energy, Inc., 474 S.W.3d 454 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2015, pet. dism’d) (blowout insurance).
69. In re Deepwater Horizon, 470 S.W.3d 452, 464–65 (Tex. 2015).
70. Id. at 455.
71. Id. at 456.
72. Id. at 457.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 458.
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and excess-insurance policies.”75
Under Transocean’s contract-construction theory, “the Drilling Con-
tract requires Transocean to name BP as an additional insured only for
the above-surface pollution risk that Transocean assumed and, as a result,
BP [is not entitled to] additional-insured status for subsurface pollution
risks.”76 The Texas Supreme Court reasoned that determining BP’s addi-
tional-insured coverage begins within the four corners of the insurance
policies, but “it does not necessarily end there.”77 The supreme court
explained:
We do not require “magic” words to incorporate a restriction from
another contract into an insurance policy; rather, it is enough that
the policy clearly manifests an intent to include the contract as part
of the policy. . . . [W]e determine the scope of coverage from the
language employed in the insurance policy, and if the policy directs
us elsewhere, we will refer to an incorporated document to the ex-
tent required by the policy. Unless obligated to do so by the terms of
the policy, however, we do not consider coverage limitations in un-
derlying transactional documents.78
Addressing the second issue, the supreme court noted: “BP is not
named in any of the insurance policies nor is there any claim or evidence
that it is expressly included as an additional insured in an endorsement or
certificate of insurance.”79
Instead, the policies confer coverage by reference to the Drilling
Contract in which (1) Transocean assumed some liability for pollu-
tion that might otherwise be imposed on BP (making that contract
an ‘Insured Contract’) and (2) Transocean is ‘obliged’ to procure in-
surance coverage for BP as an additional insured (making BP an
‘Insured’).80
The supreme court explained that “it becomes apparent that the only rea-
sonable interpretation of [the Drilling Contract’s additional-insured
clause] is that the parties did not intend for BP to be named as an addi-
tional insured for the subsurface pollution liabilities BP expressly as-
sumed in the Drilling Contract.”81
Despite generally being an additional insured under Transocean’s pol-
icy, BP did not have coverage here. The supreme court did not restrict its
analysis to the four corners of Transocean’s insurance policy; rather, be-
cause Transocean’s insurance policy connected the additional insured
coverage to the indemnities assumed by Transocean under the Drilling
Contract, the supreme court held that the Drilling Contract limited the
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 459–60.
78. Id. (internal citations omitted).
79. Id. at 464.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 465.
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scope of BP’s additional insured status under the insurance policy.82 BP
sought coverage for a subsurface release, but this was not included in the
liabilities assumed in Transocean’s indemnity obligations in the Drilling
Contract and, thus, not an event Transocean was obliged to provide cov-
erage for in its insurance obligations in the Drilling Contract.83 Because
Transocean’s insurance policy only provided additional insured status to
those for whom Transocean was obliged to provide insurance, BP was not
an additional insured for this event.84
The significance of this case is “the interplay between an insurance pol-
icy and provisions in a drilling contract” governing the allocation of risk
and the obligation to extend coverage to an additional insured.85
B. PLAINS EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION CO. V. TORCH ENERGY
ADVISORS INC.
Plains Exploration & Production Co. v. Torch Energy Advisors Inc.
construes the Excluded Assets clause in a typical Purchase and Sale
Agreement. Prior to 1990, there was a regulatory scheme in place gov-
erning offshore leasing.86 In 1990, that scheme was amended. In 1994,
Torch Energy Advisors Incorporated (Torch) obtained interests in vari-
ous undeveloped leases on the Pacific outer continental shelf (OCS
leases). In 1996, pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA),
Torch conveyed its interests in the OCS leases into the chain of title of
Plains Exploration & Production Company (Plains) subject to the Ex-
cluded Assets clause in the 1996 PSA.87 In 2001, California successfully
sued the federal government for matters affecting the OCS leases result-
ing in a different construction of the 1990 statutory amendment than the
one anticipated by the leasing parties.88 This and other litigation effec-
tively made development of the OCS leases impossible.89 In 2005, Plains
obtained a judgment that governmental repudiation occurred in 2001,
and as a result of the lawsuit, Plains was awarded restitution damages
measured by the original lease bonus payments of approximately $83 mil-
lion.90 Torch sued Plains for breach of contract under the Excluded As-
sets clause in the 1996 PSA and various other theories for its part of the
restitution damages.91
The specific PSA language at issue read as follows:
1.2. Excluded Assets. As used herein, “Excluded Assets” means . . .
(b) all claims and causes of action of [Torch] (i) arising from acts,
82. Id. at 467.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 455, 468.
86. Plains Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Torch Energy Advisors Inc., 473 S.W.3d 296, 299 (Tex.
2015).
87. Id. at 300.
88. Id. at 301.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 301–02.
91. Id. at 302.
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omissions or events, or damage to or destruction of property, occur-
ring prior to the Effective Date, (ii) arising under or with respect to
any of the Contracts that are attributable to periods of time prior to
the Effective Date (including claims for adjustments or refunds); . . .
(g) all proceeds, income or revenues (and any security or other de-
posits made) attributable to (i) the Properties for any period prior to
the Effective Date, or (ii) any Excluded Assets . . . .92
The PSA specifically reserved some inconsequential items, but made no
reference to bonus, and Torch represented in the PSA that there were no
pending claims.93 The Texas Supreme Court described the 2005 judgment
as the asset at issue and was heavily influenced by the provisions relating
to the Effective Date.94
The supreme court applied a plain meaning analysis to the operative
words, “arising from,” “arising under or with respect to,” and “attributa-
ble to.”95 The supreme court concluded these terms “unambiguously re-
quire a pre-effective date causal nexus that does not exist in this case.”96
Torch argued for a “but for” connection.97 “But for” the payment of bo-
nus (before the Effective Date) there would be no leases and thus no
judgment.98 Adopting that argument “would render the temporal division
employed in the relevant exclusions utterly meaningless.”99 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had held that enactment of the
amendment in 1990 did not breach or repudiate the OCS leases; it was
events and actions taken in 2001 and later.100 Moreover, lease bonus was
only used as a measure of damages in the 2005 judgment.101 “Because the
proceeds of the . . . judgment are neither attributable to or arising from
or with respect to pre-conveyance events, they are not excluded
assets . . . .”102
The form of the PSA and the Excluded Assets provision appear to be
fairly typical, and thus the significance of the case seems to be that in the
absence of specifically identified claims or assets, the Effective Date will
have a great impact on determining what is or is not conveyed or
excluded.103
92. Id. at 304.
93. Id. at 306.
94. Id. at 304.
95. Id. at 307.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 308.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 309.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 310.
103. See id. at 307.
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V. LITIGATION ISSUES104
A. ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESSING SYSTEMS, L.C. V.
FPL FARMING, LTD.
Environmental Processing Systems, L.C. v. FPL Farming, Ltd. held that
“lack of consent” is an element of the cause of action for trespass and not
an affirmative defense.105 FPL Farming, LTD (FPL) farms rice in Liberty
County, Texas. Environmental Processing System (EPS) leases and oper-
ates a five-acre wastewater disposal facility adjacent to FPL’s property.
FPL brought a trespass claim against EPS for deep subsurface wastewater
migration onto FPL’s property.106 The trial court judge presented the jury
with the following question on the issue of trespass:
Question 1: Did EPS trespass on FPL [Farming’s] property?
“Trespass” means an entry on the property of another without having
consent of the owner. To constitute a trespass, entry upon another’s
property need not be in person, but may be made by causing or per-
mitting a thing to cross the boundary of the property below the sur-
face of the earth. Every unauthorized entry upon the property of
another is a trespass, and the intent or motive prompting the trespass
is immaterial.
Answer yes or no.107
The issues were: (1) Whether consent is an element of the cause of action
of trespass, or an affirmative defense?; and (2) Who has the burden of
proving consent in a trespass cause of action?108
The Texas Supreme Court reviewed a century and a half of trespass-
related decisions to conclude that the supreme court has “never departed
from the inclusion of lack of consent or authorization in the definition of
104. Other cases dealing with litigation issues include the following: In re T.S.C. Seiber
Services, L.C., 771 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2014) (mineral subcontractor’s liens in bankruptcy);
Crosstex N. Texas Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 451 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014,
pet. granted) (nuisance in operation of compressor site); Matador Prod. Co. v.
Weatherford Artificial Lift Sys., Inc., 450 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet.
denied) (bad frac and contractor liability); Riemer v. State, 452 S.W.3d 491 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2014, pet. denied) (Canadian River class action on river boundary); Crawford v.
XTO Energy, Inc., 455 S.W.3d 245 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2015, pet. granted) (joinder of
owners in a pooled unit as affected by lease dispute); In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex.
2015) (water well pollution); Biltex Enters., Inc. v. Myers, No. 02-13-00465-CV, 2015 WL
1967285 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 30, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (attorney’s fees in
trespass to try title); Clark v. ConocoPhillips Co., 465 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (statute of limitations on payment of royalties in class action
cases); Sciscoe v. Enbridge Gathering (N. Texas), L.P., No. 07-13-00391-CV, 2015 WL
3463490 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2015, pet. filed) (light noise, and airborne particulate
pollution); Brenham Oil & Gas, Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 472 S.W.3d 744
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (tortious interference with production
agreement); Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore LLC, 480 S.W.3d 628 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Oct. 14, 2015, pet. filed) (subsurface trespass by drilling); In re ATP
Oil & Gas Corp., 540 B.R. 294 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015) (assignments of ORRI in
bankruptcy).
105. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C. v. FPL Farming, Ltd., 457 S.W.3d 414, 425 (Tex. 2015).
106. Id. at 417.
107. Id. (emphasis in original).
108. Id.
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a trespass.”109 A “[t]respass to real property is an unauthorized entry
upon the land of another, and may occur when one enters—or causes
something to enter—another’s property.”110
Many Texas appellate courts have concluded that “consent is an affirm-
ative defense to be pleaded and proven by the defendant.”111 Texas
courts, however, allocate the burden of proof of a particular claim by
taking into consideration: “(1) ‘[t]he comparative likelihood that a certain
situation may occur in a reasonable percentage of cases’; and (2) the diffi-
culty in proving a negative.”112 Typically, only a small fraction of trespass
cases present a consent question due to the fact that landowners have no
reason to suspect a trespass may occur and is rarely presented with an
opportunity to consent to trespass.113 When consent is at issue, the su-
preme court determined that the landowner is in the best position to
prove lack of consent or authorization “because only ‘someone acting
with the authority of the landowner or one with rightful possession’ can
authorize, or consent to, the entry.”114 To hold otherwise, the supreme
court explained, would require plaintiffs only prove an entry upon their
land, which would ignore the supreme court’s clear precedent requiring
plaintiffs demonstrate that the entry was unauthorized.115
Importantly, the supreme court’s resolution of the consent issue—cou-
pled with the jury’s determination that EPS did not trespass upon FPL’s
property—allowed the supreme court to decline FPL’s invitation to ad-
dress the question of whether deep “subsurface wastewater migration can
constitute a cause of action for trespass” under Texas law.116
The significance of this case is the supreme court’s holding that unau-
thorized entry, or lack of consent, is an element of the cause of action for
trespass with the burden on the plaintiff.117 It is also significant that the
supreme court neither approved nor disapproved of the lower court’s
analysis and holding on subsurface trespass.118
B. IN RE LONGVIEW ENERGY CO.
In re Longview Energy Co. analyzed the appropriate amount of a su-
persedeas bond when the judgment imposes a constructive trust on an oil
and gas prospect.119 Longview Energy Co. (Longview) was pursuing the
acquisition of 46,000 acres in the Eagle Ford Shale which Huff Energy
109. Id. at 418–22.
110. Id. at 422 (emphasis in original) (quoting Barnes v. Mathis, 353 S.W.3d 760, 764
(Tex. 2011)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 424 (quoting 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 397 (Tex. 2008)).
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Gen. Mills Rests., Inc. v. Texas Wings, Inc., 12 S.W.3d 827, 835 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2000), abrogated by Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 457 S.W.3d 414).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 426.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. In re Longview Energy Co., 464 S.W.3d 353, 360 (Tex. 2015).
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Fund, L.P. et al., (Huff) obtained. Huff was a minority shareholder in
Longview and there were overlapping directors and principals. “Long-
view sought disgorgement of [Huff’s] unjust enrichment but did not seek
damages.”120 Longview also did not request jury findings on damages,
because it thought the assets were undervalued.121 The jury found a
breach of fiduciary duty.122 The trial court judgment awarded Longview a
constructive trust over the prospect and “future production revenues net
of royalties and production taxes.”123 Separately, the judgment awarded
“the same future net production revenues covered by the constructive
trust ‘and an additional $95,500,000.00’” with no explanation for the
monetary award.124 An earlier (withdrawn) judgment “described the
$95.5 million as being ‘based on the jury’s finding regarding the value of
past-production revenues derived from the [Eagle Ford Shale assets, $120
million]’ but without credit for either the $127 million development costs
found by the jury or the other production expenses.”125 The multiple
Huff defendants jointly posted a $25 million bond as security to super-
sede enforcement of the judgment, Longview persuaded the trial court to
increase the bond to $25 million for each defendant, and all parties peti-
tioned the Texas Supreme Court for relief by mandamus as to the amount
of the supersedeas bond.126
The amount of a supersedeas bond is governed by Chapter 52.006 of
the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which is tracked by Rule 24.2 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.127 The bond “must equal the sum of
compensatory damages awarded in the judgment, interest for the esti-
mated duration of the appeal, and costs awarded in the judgment.”128 The
issue in the case was whether the $95.5 million was compensatory
damages.129
To begin its analysis, the supreme court noted: “If the trial court did
not calculate the $95.5 million the way the [trial] court first explained [in
the withdrawn judgment], then the number seems to have been pulled
from thin air. Longview offers no explanation for what the figure repre-
sents.”130 Longview argued that the judgment was not punitive and there-
fore it must be compensatory.131 The supreme court reasoned that the
judgment could be punitive because it awarded gross past production rev-
enues less asset acquisition costs, which presumably made the defendants
liable for an amount in excess of net gains.132 Regardless, disgorgement is
120. Id. at 356.
121. Id. at 351.
122. Id. at 356.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting the withdrawn trial court judgment).
126. Id. at 356–57.
127. Id. at 358–59.
128. Id. at 359 (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2).
129. Id. at 360.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 360–61.
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not damages.133 The supreme court had previously construed Rule 24.2 in
the context of attorney fees and held that attorney fees are not compen-
satory damages for purposes of calculating a supersedeas bond.134 The
supreme court there analyzed the recovery of attorney fees as “compen-
satory in that they help make a claimant whole, but they are not, and
have never been, damages.”135 The supreme court had previously held
that equitable forfeiture “is not mainly compensatory . . . nor is it mainly
punitive” and “cannot . . . be measured by . . . actual damages.”136 “Dis-
gorgement is compensatory in the same sense attorney fees, interest, and
costs are, but it is not damages.”137 Therefore, in this case, “[t]he only . . .
amount for which security must be given is costs, which [were]
$66,645.”138
Another issue in the case was the trial court’s post-judgment order that
Huff produce monthly to Longview, during the appeal, all of the docu-
ments affecting the prospect, which was affirmed.139
The significance of the case is the stark contrast in the amount required
for a supersedeas bond in a damages case compared to a disgorgement or
constructive trust case, particularly when the dispute involves an oil and
gas prospect.140
C. PHILLIPS V. CARLTON ENERGY GROUP, LLC
Phillips v. Carlton Energy Group, LLC held that when the market
value of a prospect is measured by lost profits, lost profits must be proved
with reasonable certainty.141 This case arose out of a dispute among par-
ties competing for a concession to explore for coalbed methane in an un-
proven field in Bulgaria. The alignment of the parties and the facts were
complicated, but Carlton secured a jury verdict of tortious interference
with contract resulting in the loss of the prospect.142 Carlton alleged it
was entitled to recover the market value of its lost interest in the Bulgaria
prospect, and the issue in the case was the determination of market value
by proof of lost profits attributable to the loss of the prospect. Carlton’s
experts provided three damages models ranging from $12.54 million to
$31.16 million to $11.305 billion.143 The models were intended to estab-
lish the fair market value of Carlton’s lost investment measured by the
amount of its lost profits.144 The jury awarded Carlton $66.5 million in
133. Id. at 361.
134. Id. at 360 (citing In re Nalle Plastics Family Ltd. P’ship, 406 S.W.3d 168, 174 (Tex.
2013)).
135. Id. (quoting In re Nalle Plastics Family Ltd. P’ship, 406 S.W.3d at 173).
136. Id. at 361 (quoting Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 240 (Tex. 1999)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 362.
140. See id. at 359–61.
141. Phillips v. Carlton Energy Group, LLC, 475 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tex. 2015).
142. Id. at 269–73.
143. Id. at 274.
144. Id. at 273–75.
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actual damages,145 which did not clearly relate to any of Carlton’s three
models.
Phillips argued that the fair market value of the prospect was too spec-
ulative to support an award of damages.146 “A property’s fair market
value is what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller, neither acting
under any compulsion.”147 “Fair market value is generally determined ei-
ther by using comparable market sales, calculating replacement cost less
depreciation, or capitalizing net income—that is, profits.”148 The Texas
Supreme Court recognized that where lost profits are sought to be recov-
ered as consequential damages, the “lost profits can be recovered only
when the amount is proved with reasonable certainty.”149 “The reasona-
ble certainty requirement ‘is intended to be flexible enough to accommo-
date the myriad circumstances in which claims for lost profits arise.’”150
The question in this case was whether the reasonable certainty require-
ment should be extended to cases where “lost profits are not sought as
damages themselves but are used to determine the market value of prop-
erty for which recovery is sought.”151 The supreme court held that the
reasonable certainty requirement should be extended to such cases, be-
cause “[t]he purpose of the requirement is to prevent recovery based on
speculation,” and there was no reason why the requirement should not
apply equally to lost profits and lost market value.152
The supreme court determined that two of Carlton’s damage models
were merely conjectural and based on sweeping assumptions.153 Specifi-
cally, Carlton’s experts made unsupported projections about the value of
gas in the ground, the amount of gas actually recoverable, cost of recov-
ery, and cost of marketing, etc.154 However, there was evidence that the
parties fixed various prices as they bought and sold fractional parts of the
prospect.155 The supreme court held that when there is evidence of prices
fixed by real investors in a market in which such interests are bought and
sold, all of the speculation is subsumed into the data they rely upon to
reach their valuation.156 Therefore, at least one of the damage models
had some evidence to support the verdict. Specifically, the supreme court
looked to Phillips’ agreement to pay Carlton $8.5 million in exchange for
a 10% interest in the project (and adjusted for other factors), to support a
145. Id. at 275.
146. Id. at 277.
147. Id. (citing Hous. Unlimited, Inc. Metal Processing v. Mel Acres Ranch, 443 S.W.3d
820, 831 (Tex. 2014)).
148. Id. (citing City of Harlingen v. Estate of Sharboneau, 48 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tex.
2001); Miga v. Jensen, 96 S.W.3d 207, 213 (Tex. 2002)).
149. Id. (citing Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Mgmt., Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276,
279 (Tex. 1994)).
150. Id. (quoting Tex. Instruments, Inc., 877 S.W.2d at 279).
151. Id. at 280.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 281.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 281–82.
156. Id. at 282.
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valuation of $31.16 million.157 The issue was ultimately remanded to the
court of appeals to address factual insufficiency as to valuation.158
The significance of this case is the holding that the valuation of a lost
prospect, when measured by lost profits to find market value, is subject to
the requirement that the lost profits must be proved with reasonable cer-
tainty.159 The case also provides examples of expert testimony on gas in
place market value that a court will not accept as proof to a reasonable
certainty.
D. RANCHERO ESPERANZA, LTD. V. MARATHON OIL CO.
Ranchero Esperanza, Ltd. v. Marathon Oil Co. analyzed the related
issues of standing, accrual of the cause of action, limitations, and the dis-
covery rule in a case involving salt water surface damages caused by neg-
ligence in plugging a well.160 In 1989, Marathon “plugged and abandoned
Well 812.”161 In 1999, Marathon ceased operating and sold the property.
In 2004, Ranchero Esperanza bought the surface estate and an undivided
one-half interest in the Trinity Aquifer beneath the land.162 On July 20,
2008, a subsequent operator discovered salt water flowing from Well 812,
apparently because the plug in Well 812 had failed and the salt water was
migrating from a nearby injection well. On July 28, 2008, Ranchero Es-
peranza had actual knowledge of the leak. On July 27, 2010, Ranchero
Esperanza filed suit asserting claims “for negligence, trespass, and
nuisance.”163
On appeal of summary judgment, there were two issues: (1) whether
Ranchero Esperanza had standing to sue Marathon; and (2) if so,
whether Ranchero Esperanza’s claims were barred by the statute of limi-
tations.164 In response to the limitations defense, Ranchero Esperanza
invoked the discovery rule.165 The El Paso Court of Appeals began the
analysis by addressing Ranchero Esperanza’s standing, which is jurisdic-
tional. There is a well established principle that “injury to land is a per-
sonal right belonging to the [landowner] at the time of injury,” and such
claims do not pass to subsequent purchasers absent an express assign-
ment of the claim.166 If the cause of action accrued prior to Ranchero
Esperanza’s purchase in 2004, Ranchero Esperanza would lack standing
157. Id. at 281–82.
158. Id. at 283.
159. See id. at 269.
160. Ranchero Esperanza, Ltd. v. Marathon Oil Co, 488 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2015, no pet.).
161. Id. at 356.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 357.
164. Id. at 356–47.
165. Id. at 363.
166. Id. at 359 (quoting La Tierra de Simmons Familia, Ltd. v. Main Event Entm’t, LP,
No. 03-10-00503-CV, 2012 WL 753184, at *5 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (mem.
op.)) (citing Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 331 S.W.3d 419, 424 (Tex. 2010)).
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because it received no assignment of claims.167 Ordinarily, the time when
a cause of action accrues is a question of law, and it accrues when the
injury first occurs.168 Marathon argued that the injury accrued in 1989
when the well was negligently plugged, and Ranchero Esperanza argued
that the injury accrued in 2008 when the well first leaked salt water.169
Many cases analyze when the cause of action accrues in relation to the
time the defendant acted,170 which are difficult to parse, but this court of
appeals concluded that the one consistency is that there must be some
injury, however slight.171 The court of appeals decided that the claims
accrued in July 2008 when the surface damages first occurred.172
The parties stipulated that all of the claims were subject to a two-year
statute of limitations. Suit was filed approximately two years and a week
after the cause of action accrued (when the subsequent operator first dis-
covered the salt water leak). Ranchero Esperanza, however, did not have
any actual knowledge of the leak until about a week after the leak began.
Ranchero Esperanza invoked the discovery rule to toll the running of the
statute of limitations for that week.173 To negate the discovery rule, Mar-
athon had to prove, as a matter of law, that there is “no genuine issue of
material fact about when the plaintiff discovered, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have discovered the nature of its injury.”174
Generally, the discovery rule applies only to situations where the injury is
“‘inherently undiscoverable’ and the evidence of the injury is objectively
verifiable.”175 The court of appeals held that the nature of the injury, that
is, surface damage due to leaking salt water, is “not inherently undiscov-
erable.”176 “Inherently undiscoverable is a legal question ‘decided on a
categorical basis rather than case-specific basis,” so surface damages aris-
ing from salt water emerging from an oil well is not inherently undiscov-
erable.177 The discovery rule does not apply to this category of claims.178
Marathon met its burden as a matter of law that the statute of limitations
had expired prior to Ranchero Esperanza bringing its claims.179
The significance of the case is the holding that a cause of action for a
defective plug does not accrue until the plug fails, which could be many




170. Id. at 359–63.
171. Id. (citing Hous. Water-Works Co. v. Kennedy, 8 S.W. 36, 37 (Tex. 1888)).
172. Id. at 361.
173. Id. at 364 n.9.
174. Id. (citing KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cty. Hous. Fin. Corp. 988 S.W.2d 746,
748 (Tex. 1999)).
175. Id. at 365 (citing Murphy v. Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265, 270 (Tex. 1997); S.V. v.
R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 6–7 (Tex. 1996)).
176. Id.
177. Id. (quoting Via Net, U.S. v. TIG Ins. Co., 211 S.W.3d 310, 314 (Tex. 2006)).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 363.
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face damages accrues when the plug fails,181 and that is inherently discov-
erable when salt water emerges from the well.182
VI. REGULATION ISSUES183
A. HOOKS V. SAMSON LONE STAR, LTD. PARTNERSHIP
Hooks v. Samson Lone Star, Ltd. Partnership held that although rea-
sonable diligence should lead to discovery of information in the records
of the TRC, fraudulent filings in the TRC by lessee created a fact ques-
tion as to whether earlier, correct filings should have been discovered by
lessor in the exercise of reasonable diligence.184 Hooks leased to Samson.
The Hooks lease prohibited pooling and included offset obligations that
triggered if a gas well was “completed within 1,320 feet of Hooks’ lease
line.”185 The offset obligations were to drill, release, or pay compensatory
royalty. In 2000, Samson drilled a well that bottomed about 1,186 feet
from Hooks’ lease line and triggered the offset obligation. Hooks and
Samson agreed to amend the Hooks lease to pool the lease into a unit
associated with the new well. In 2007, Hooks sued Samson for fraud and
breach of contract. During the 2001 negotiations to amend the lease,
Samson’s landman presented Hooks with a plat showing the well to be
located outside the protected zone. Earlier, in 2000, Samson filed a simi-
lar plat with the TRC that incorrectly located the bottom hole outside the
protected zone. Months before that, Samson filed another plat at the
TRC that correctly located the well as within the protected zone.186 There
was some conflicting evidence on the meaning of each plat, but the cen-
tral issue was whether reasonable diligence required Hooks to go behind
the incorrect plats to find the earlier correct plat at the TRC.187 The jury
found that Hooks could not have discovered Samson’s fraud until 2007188
and the lower court awarded Hooks a judgment for more than $21 mil-
lion in damages, attorney’s fees and post-judgment interest at a rate of
18%.189
Through a series of decisions, the Texas Supreme Court has been grad-
ually defining the effect of TRC filings upon the running of the statute of
limitations and fraudulent concealment. “We have held that not all [TRC]
records create constructive notice, meaning that in some circumstances,
181. See id. at 362.
182. See id. at 365.
183. Other cases dealing with regulation issues include the following: Oneok, Inc. v.
Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015) (natural gas index pricing and state antitrust claims);
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 3d 486 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (mem. op.)
(CERCLA liability for clean up costs); Entergy Corp. v. Jenkins, 469 S.W.3d 330 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (FERC jurisdiction).
184. Hooks v. Samson Lone Star, Ltd. P’ship, 457 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tex. 2015).
185. Id. at 57.
186. Id. at 56.
187. Id. at 57.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 56.
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[TRC] filings may exist that one is not charged with discovering.”190 If
TRC records do not impart constructive notice, then the issue focuses on
what would be discovered in the TRC records by the exercise of reasona-
ble diligence. The decided cases indicate that the supreme court is very
reluctant to delay the accrual of a cause of action or to toll the running of
limitations. “These cases reveal that when there is actual or constructive
notice, or when information is ‘readily accessible and publicly available,’
then, as a matter of law, the accrual of a fraud claim is not delayed.”191
“Although ‘the date a cause of action accrues is normally a question of
law,’ reasonable diligence is an issue of fact. Nevertheless, in some cir-
cumstances, we can still determine as a matter of law that reasonable dili-
gence would have uncovered the wrong.”192 The supreme court then
reviewed and affirmed “BP America Production Co. v. Marshall, 342
S.W.3d 59 (Tex. 2011) and Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924 (Tex.
2011), where reasonable diligence required sophisticated lessors to ac-
quaint themselves with [TRC] records.”193 That is, the lessor is generally
charged with knowledge of whatever an examination of the TRC records
would reveal.
In this case, the supreme court held that the exercise of reasonable
diligence was a fact question which could not be determined as a matter
of law.194 “The factfinder, no doubt, may consider the failure to examine
older records when determining whether reasonable diligence was exer-
cised, but their availability is not enough to establish that reasonable dili-
gence was not exercised as a matter of law.”195 “[H]ere the records
themselves were tainted by fraud and thus provide no conclusive proof on
the subject.”196 The opinion does not hold that a lessor is relieved of the
duty to review all TRC records in its exercise of reasonable diligence:
“We hold that when the defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentations ex-
tend to the [TRC] record itself, earlier inconsistent filings cannot be used
to establish, as a matter of law, reasonable diligence was not exercised.
Under these circumstances, reasonable diligence remains a fact
question.”197
Hooks also claimed that Samson breached the contract under the most-
favored-nations clause in the Hooks lease.198 Samson originally “leased a
qualifying oil and gas interest from the State [of Texas] at the same 25%
royalty [it] paid Hooks.”199 “[T]o induce the State to consent to a Pooling
Agreement, Samson increased the State’s” share of production from the
pooled unit so that the State was effectively receiving a 28.28896% roy-
190. Id. at 60 (citing HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Tex. 1998)).
191. Id. at 59 (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 929 (Tex. 2011)).
192. Id. at 57–58 (internal citations omitted).
193. Id. at 57–59.
194. Id. at 61.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 55.
197. Id. at 61.
198. Id. at 63.
199. Id. at 62.
2016] Oil, Gas and Mineral Law 329
alty on the State’s tract.200 Samson argued that this did not increase the
royalty under the State’s lease.201 Reasoning that “royalty owed on pro-
duction from the whole unit is necessarily tied to royalty owed on produc-
tion from the lessor’s individual tracts,” the supreme court ruled that the
later pooling agreement, which allocated a unit royalty interest to the
State, resulted in a higher royalty payment on the State’s tract.202 There-
fore, Samson was obligated to match this amount when paying royalties
to Hooks, and its failure to do so was a breach.203
Hooks also had two more leases with Samson which contained similar
offset obligations (drill, release, or compensatory royalty). Hooks argued
that the duty to pay compensatory royalty was a recurring obligation and
that Hooks could recover beginning with the payment due four years
before suit was filed.204 Samson argued that even if the failure to pay
compensatory royalties was recurring, which would bring the claim within
the limitations period, the leases authorized Samson to elect non-recur-
ring options, such as to release or drill, and a breach of these provisions
would be barred.205 The supreme court noted that payment of compensa-
tory royalties was to take place after the first two options, and therefore,
“Samson impliedly elected to perform the later one” because “it would
not be just to allow the obligor’s silent, continuous breach to constitute an
election of the non-recurring alternative.”206
The case affirms that TRC records are not constructive notice, but that
a lessor (or at least a sophisticated lessor) is generally subject to whatever
would be discovered from a review of the TRC records.207 A court will
hold, as a matter of law, that the lessor knew whatever those records
contain.208 The significance of this case is that fraudulent filings make it a
question of fact whether earlier, correct filings should have been
discovered.209
B. ROLAND OIL CO. V. R.R. COMMISSION OF TEXAS
Roland Oil Co. v. R.R. Commission of Texas held that an operator did
not establish a good faith claim to a continuing right to operate a lease
under the rules of the TRC.210 Beginning in 1994, Roland Oil Company
(Roland) operated the North Charlotte Field Unit Lease in Atascosa
County, Texas. The lease consisted of thirty-one wells drilled as far back
as the 1950s. In 2005, Roland asked the TRC “for an extension of time to
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 63.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 66–67.
205. Id. at 67–68.
206. Id. at 68.
207. See id. at 60.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. Roland Oil Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., No. 03-12-00247-CV, 2015 WL 870232, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 27, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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complete the required testing on certain inactive wells” that was required
to be completed before the wells could be plugged under Texas Adminis-
trative Code § 3.14(b)(2)–(3).211 “[T]he [TRC] determined that Roland
had been delinquent on the required testing since 1994,” denied Roland’s
request, and “issued a February 2005 ‘severance’ order [that] effectively
bar[red] Roland from producing [any] well on the Lease.”212 Roland
ceased producing from May 2005 to August 2006 (fifteen months), when
it finally completed the repairs necessary for the testing, and the TRC
then lifted the severance and granted the extension of time to plug.213
However, “in June 2006, a mineral owner under the Lease had alerted the
[TRC] to [the mineral owner’s] contention that the Lease had lapsed dur-
ing the period of non-production.”214
Under the TRC’s rules, the TRC could grant an extension to plug only
if the operator has a good faith claim to a continuing right to operate the
well. “A ‘good faith claim’ in this context is defined as a ‘factually sup-
ported claim based on a recognized legal theory to a continuing posses-
sory right in a mineral estate, such as evidence of a currently valid oil and
gas lease or a recorded deed conveying a fee interest in the mineral es-
tate.’”215 “[The TRC] notified Roland of the mineral owner’s assertion,
. . . asked Roland to provide evidence of its good faith claim to operate
the [lease],” and indicated that its “failure to do so would result in cancel-
lation of” the extension to plug.216 Roland asserted that the repair and
testing activities were unit operations under the Unit Agreement, and
therefore Roland’s lease had not lapsed.217 Alternatively, Roland argued
that the TRC’s “severance order had triggered the . . . force majeure
clause and suspended its obligation to conduct ‘Unit Operations.’”218 The
TRC cancelled the plugging extensions.219
The term of the Unit Agreement continued for so long as there were
Unit Operations without a cessation of more than ninety days.220 The
Unit Agreement defined Unit Operations as “all operations conducted
. . . pursuant to this agreement . . . for or on account of the development
and operation of the Unitized Formation for the production of Unitized
Substances.”221 Roland contended that work done on inactive wells was
Unit Operations. The Austin Court of Appeals disagreed and held that
the required operations must be for production and that work done in
preparation for plugging was not for production.222 Therefore, “the
211. Id. at *1–2.
212. Id. at *2.
213. Id.
214. Id. at *1–2.
215. Id. at *2. (quoting former 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.14(a)(1)(E) (2014)).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at *7.
219. Id. at *3.
220. Id. at *7.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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[TRC’s] legal conclusion regarding the meaning of ‘operations’ was not in
error.”223 “[T]he work in question was performed on inactive wells to
comply with the former Commission Rule 3.14,” to prepare for the plug-
ging of those inactive wells, and “those inactive wells remained inactive
after the required testing.”224 Therefore, Roland’s work “did not consti-
tute good faith [effort] to produce oil and gas.”225
There must be some reasonable basis in the record to support the
TRC’s finding that the only work done between May 2005 and August
2006 was done to inactive wells.226 Though there was testimony by Ro-
land’s principal as to various other work and maintenance that went on at
the lease during the gap in production (“i.e., ‘constant’ maintenance
work, including flow-line and electrical repairs, monitoring for leaks, in-
specting roads, fixing pumps, and mowing the grass”), the evidence did
“not specify when this work was done, how often it was performed or
whether it was performed on any . . . active wells.”227 Under the substan-
tial evidence rule, there was a reasonable basis in the record to support
the agency’s finding.228
If the repair and testing activities were found to trigger the force
majeure clause, then Roland’s obligations under the Unit Agreement
would be suspended.229 The Unit Agreement’s force majeure provision
stated that “[a]ll obligations imposed by this agreement . . . shall be sus-
pended while compliance is prevented, in whole or in part by . . . order of
a governmental agency . . . or by any other cause or causes beyond reason-
able control of the party.”230 The provision used the phrase “force
majeure” twice and it incorporated the common force majeure concept of
listing events beyond the parties’ control and then including a catchall
“other” category.231 A reasonable construction of this force majeure
clause is that the catchall “by any other cause or causes beyond reasona-
ble control of the party” must be read in context of the other listed
events.232 The inclusion of “other” was an expression of intent by the
drafters of the Unit Agreement that the force majeure clause be triggered
by events or orders beyond the reasonable control of the party.233 “[T]he
[TRC’s] order of severance . . . was within the reasonable control of
Roland.”234
This is an administrative appeal which bears only upon the TRC’s de-
termination and the implications it may have on future matters requiring
223. Id.





229. Id. at *4–5.
230. Id. at *5 (emphasis in original).
231. Id.
232. Id. at *5–6 (emphasis removed).
233. Id. at *6.
234. Id.
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a showing of a good faith claim to a continuing right to operate a well.235
It is not a decision that determines or creates “title or a right to posses-
sion.”236 The significance of the case is limited to those regulatory
matters.237
C. ETC MARKETING, LTD. V. HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT
ETC Marketing, Ltd. v. Harris County Appraisal District held that nat-
ural gas stored in Texas for future transportation and sale in interstate
commerce was subject to ad valorem taxation in Texas.238 ETC Market-
ing, Ltd. (ETC), a natural gas marketer, conducted business in Texas and
had multiple employees and offices there. Its purpose was to buy and sell
natural gas in the interstate market. ETC bought principally from the
“Katy Hub,” a central delivery and distribution point for natural gas in
and out of Texas, and sold to out of state customers. ETC immediately
entrusted gas it purchased to its affiliate Houston Pipeline Company
(Houston), an intrastate pipeline company located wholly in Texas. Hous-
ton stored ETC’s gas for up to several months in the Bammel reservoir,
which Houston owned in Harris County, Texas. This allowed ETC to
market and sell the gas at a more financially advantageous time. All gas
from ETC and others, both in the pipeline and in storage, is commingled
and segregated only by paper allocations. Houston paid ad valorem taxes
on the equipment and property it owned in Harris County, including that
related to the Bammel reservoir. In 2010, the Harris County Appraisal
District (HCAD) appraised natural gas ETC had purchased at the Katy
Hub and stored with Houston in the Bammel reservoir and assessed ETC
ad valorem taxes.239 ETC challenged the assessment arguing that the
stored gas was in interstate commerce and exempt from state ad valorem
taxation.240
The U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Commerce Clause,241 which
governs the power to regulate interstate commerce, “to include a ‘dor-
mant’ Commerce Clause” that implicitly prohibits “a state’s imposition of
discriminatory burdens on interstate commerce.”242 It “does not relieve
those engaged in interstate commerce” from sharing the state tax burden
for services the state provides.243 To prove a tax invalid under the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause, a taxpayer must demonstrate that the taxed ac-
235. See id. at *1.
236. See id. at *2 n.6.
237. See id.
238. ETC Mktg., Ltd. v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., 476 S.W.3d 501 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. filed).
239. Id. at 504–06.
240. Id. at 506, 513; see also id. at 508 (For purposes of its opinion, the court of appeals
“assume[d] without deciding that the natural gas at issue [was] in the stream of interstate
commerce”—ETC’s primary argument throughout the course of the case.).
241. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
242. ETC Marketing, Ltd., 476 S.W.3d at 507 (citing Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich.
Pub. Servs. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005)).
243. Id. at 508 (citing W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)).
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tivity “lack[s] a substantial nexus to the taxing state; . . . is not fairly
apportioned; . . . discriminates against interstate commerce; or . . . is not
fairly related to the services provided by the State.”244
Despite ETC’s argument that there was no substantial nexus between
the activity to which the tax applied and the taxing state, the First Hous-
ton Court of Appeals identified many factors in support of its holding
that there was a substantial nexus between ETC’s natural gas in the Bam-
mel reservoir and the state of Texas.245 ETC had multiple offices and
employees in Texas. It purchased the gas in Texas, transported it through
an intrastate pipeline company located wholly within the state, made the
decision to store it in Texas, admitted to owning the gas at the time and
place of appraisal,246 deliberately stored it in Harris County for months at
a time for its own business purposes, had the right to sell it wherever it
wished, and had not already designated it for transport to another
state.247
The court of appeals held that the tax was fairly apportioned.248 The
Texas Tax Code taxed only the tangible personal property stored in the
jurisdiction of the taxing entity beyond a temporary period. The tax was
“internally consistent” in that it would not result in multiple taxation to
an entity taxed in another state under an identical statute (because it only
taxed gas in storage in Texas on a particular date).249 It was “externally
consistent” in that it taxed only that portion of revenue from interstate
activity reflecting the in-state component of the activity taxed.250
The court of appeals held the tax did not discriminate against interstate
commerce.251 The tax was imposed only on the quantity of gas stored in
Harris County, which ETC acknowledged it owned on the date of taxa-
tion. The tax placed no burden on interstate commerce that was not
placed on comparable competing intrastate commerce.252 There was no
244. Id. (quoting Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 310–11
(1994)).
245. See id. at 508–09.
246. Id. at 505 n.3 (ETC had alleged in its original petition that it owned property
within HCAD’s jurisdiction and specifically defined property to include “Bammel Working
Gas.”); see also e.g., id. at 506–11 (making frequent reference to this admission as a fact in
holding ETC liable for the taxes as assessed).
247. See id. at 509–10 (distinguishing Peoples Gas, Light, & Coke Co. v. Harrison Cent.
Appraisal Dist., 270 S.W.3d 208 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. denied), because “Peo-
ples Gas had no physical facilities, employees, representatives, or customers in Texas”); id.
at 510 (distinguishing Midland Central Appraisal District v. BP America Production Co.,
282 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, pet. denied), because in Midland, oil passing
through interstate pipeline was held temporarily in a Texas tank, but not for any business
purpose of owner); see also id. (dismissing ETC’s contention that physical presence does
not satisfy the substantial nexus test in ad valorem cases).
248. Id. at 512.
249. Id. at 511.
250. Id. at 511–12 (The court of appeals, relying on ETC’s admission of ownership,
dismissed the “argument that the tax was externally inconsistent” because the properties of
gas and gas transportation make it impossible to identify the particular gas molecules at
issue as being the same gas bought and stored in Texas.).
251. Id.
252. Id.
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evidence that the “taxes were selectively imposed on interstate commerce
or that the rates” or procedures were more onerous than for property not
in interstate commerce.253
ETC argued that the tax did not fairly relate to any services provided
by the state, because Houston paid ad valorem taxes on the Bammel res-
ervoir and had control over the activity taxed. The court of appeals held
that ETC “retained control over the disposition of the gas for its own
business purposes.”254 It also found that services such as “police and fire
protection . . . [and] State’s maintenance of a civilized society are justifi-
cations enough for the imposition of a tax,” and both the owner of the gas
and the pipeline company benefited from state provided services.255
Therefore, the tax was “fairly related to services provided” within the
state.256
“Under the Tax Code, unless exempt by law, tangible personal prop-
erty is taxable if it is located in the taxing unit ‘for longer than a tempo-
rary period.’”257 The significance of the case is the holding that gas
destined for the interstate market, but held in storage for several months
in Texas before a sale into the interstate market, is subject to Texas ad
valorem tax.258
D. UNITED STATES V. CITGO PETROLEUM CORP.
United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp. held that uncovered waste-
water treatment tanks resulting in dead birds was not a criminal violation
of either the Clean Air Act or the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.259 Oil refin-
ery wastewater treatment systems may “emit dangerous levels of volatile
organic compounds (‘VOCs’).”260 Wastewater is collected through a se-
ries of lateral sewers and treated at multiple stages designed to separate
the oil from the wastewater and to treat the water before release. The
first stage is called an oil-water separator. The oil-water separator causes
oils and solids to separate from the water, allowing between 50% to 99%
of the oils and solids to be skimmed away. After passing through the oil-
water separator, the wastewater is allowed to pool in equalization tanks
that act as a holding system for wastewater to control the flow to the
other downstream treatment processes. While in the equalization tanks,
gases are pumped into the wastewater to generate bubbles, which attach
to oils in the wastewater, allowing more oil to be skimmed off and re-
cycled. The wastewater then flows through biological treatment and a
clarifier before being released. CITGO’s oil-water separators had roofs,
253. Id.
254. Id. at 513.
255. Id. (quoting Okla. Tax. Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995)).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 507 (quoting TEX. TAX CODE Ann. § 11.12 (West 2015)); see also id. at 507
n.6.
258. See id. at 513.
259. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 483–84 (5th Cir. 2015).
260. Id. at 479.
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but the equalization tanks did not. An inspection revealed 130,000 barrels
of oil floating on the top of the equalization tanks and the remains of five
pelicans and several dozen ducks.261
The Clean Air Act requires oil-water separators to have roofs.262 Sub-
part QQQ of the regulations (Subpart QQQ) defines an oil-water
separator as wastewater treatment equipment:
[U]sed to separate oil from water consisting of a separation tank,
which also includes the forebay and other separator basins, skim-
mers, weirs, grit chambers, and sludge hoppers. Slop oil facilities, in-
cluding tanks, are included in this term along with storage vessels
and auxiliary equipment located between individual drain systems
and the oil-water separator. This term does not include storage ves-
sels or auxiliary equipment which do not come in contact with or
store oily wastewater.263
Inspectors determined that CITGO was utilizing the equalization tanks
as oil-water separators and cited CITGO for failing to have roofs on the
equalization tanks.264 The issue was whether an equalization tank can be
an oil-water separator.265
The EPA argued that equipment “used to separate oil from water” in-
cluded the equalization tanks (an argument that the Fifth Circuit said
would include the whole wastewater treatment process). The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit focused on a plain reading of the defini-
tion of oil-water separator and concluded that the regulation was not di-
rected solely at the process but at the process and specific equipment.266
Specifically, the Fifth Circuit stated that “[t]he relative pronoun ‘which’
refers to the noun immediately preceding it—‘separation tank.’”267 In
other words, the definition of an oil-water separator includes all of the
spaces in which separation occurs, and thus all components of the oil-
water separator (forebay, separation tank, outlet basin) must be covered,
but not the equalization tanks.268
The Fifth Circuit bolsters its conclusion by pointing out that Subpart
Kb of the Clean Air Act (Subpart Kb)269 governs the operation of stor-
age vessels used in the wastewater treatment process, requiring them to
have roofs, if they emit VOCs above a certain threshold.270 Interpreting
Subpart QQQ to include equalization tanks would be to eliminate the
force of Subpart Kb’s vapor pressure trigger.271
261. Id. at 480 n.4.
262. Id. at 480.
263. Id. at 482 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 60.691 (2015)).
264. Id. at 480.
265. Id. at 481.
266. Id. at 481, 485–86.
267. Id. 484.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 485 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 60.692–3(d) (2015)).
270. Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.110b(a), 60.112b(a)).
271. Id. at 485–86.
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The Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 “makes it ‘unlawful at any time,
by any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, at-
tempt to take, capture or kill . . . any migratory bird,’ in violation of regu-
lations and permits.”272 “The act imposes strict liability on violators,
punishable by a maximum $15,000 fine and six months imprisonment.”273
“CITGO was indicted for ‘taking’ . . . [the] birds, not for ‘killing’
them.”274 The Fifth Circuit compared numerous cases and analyzed the
split in opinion among the circuit courts. Generally, the Second and Tenth
Circuits hold oilfield equipment operators guilty when birds die as a re-
sult of operations. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits do not. In this case, the
Fifth Circuit joined the latter and held “that a ‘taking’ is limited to delib-
erate acts done directly and intentionally to migratory birds.”275
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that to take or to kill migratory birds re-
quired some affirmative action.276 The Fifth Circuit cited various sources
to note that despite the Migratory Bird Act protecting approximately 836
species of birds, each year, as many as 976 million birds are killed flying
into windows, 60 million birds are killed by cars, and, just in Wisconsin, 39
million birds are killed by domesticated cats.277 According to the Fifth
Circuit, it would be absurd to conclude that Congress intended for some-
one to pay $15,000 and serve six months for each of those deaths.278
The significance of the case is the holding in the Fifth Circuit that “ille-
gally ‘taking’ migratory birds involves only ‘conduct intentionally di-
rected at birds, such as hunting and trapping, not [ ] commercial activity
that unintentionally and indirectly causes’ migratory bird deaths.”279 The
rejection of the EPA’s expansion of the obligation to enclose tanks is
mostly significant as a strict reading of an existing regulation, which the
EPA has the power to amend and expand.280
VII. CONCLUSION
Given that the production of oil in the United States has approximately
doubled since 2005, it is not surprising that the number of reported oil
and gas cases in a given year has also approximately doubled. Because we
have been on the up side of the commodity cycle and have been exper-
iencing a broad expansion of exploration and development, reported
cases have been concentrated on issues commonly arising with those ac-
tivities. We have seen a number of cases on the nature and scope of a
proceeding in trespass to try title, categorical limitations of the scope of
the discovery rule, and clarification of the notice provided by public
272. Id. at 488 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 703(a), § 704(a) (2012)).
273. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 707(a)).
274. Id. at 489.
275. Id. at 488–93.
276. Id. at 492.
277. Id. at 493–94.
278. Id.
279. See id. 488, 494.
280. See id. at 483–84.
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records not included in the deed records. These are generally conveyanc-
ing, lease and leasing cases.
More recently, there has been an increase in cases dealing with opera-
tional issues, such as condemnation, easements, surface damages, tres-
pass, subsurface and particulate trespass, and issues and disputes arising
under industry contracts, such as exploration agreements, operating
agreements, drilling contracts, and insurance contracts. Litigation over
the scope and meaning of purchase and sale agreements was focused on
what was conveyed, but it is now shifting toward representations, warran-
ties, indemnities, and exclusions.
Most recently, there is an uptick in cases involving liens, security inter-
ests, and bankruptcy, which can be expected to accelerate. There has
been a steady stream of lease termination cases driven by the dramatic
increase in bonus payments. The downturn in commodity prices will re-
duce those bonus payments, but lessees will struggle to produce their
wells in paying quantities, so lease termination cases are likely to con-
tinue. The midstream sector has also been aggressively expanding, and
those projects tend to be long term and many will continue to fill in the
gaps in the infrastructure. We will probably see more cases on condemna-
tion, easements, surface damages, and nuisance.
With over 100 years of oil and gas case law in Texas, the direction of oil
and gas jurisprudence is generally evolutionary, not revolutionary. Law-
yers and judges are usually knowledgeable, and most cases add something
useful in the quest to perfect that jurisprudence.
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